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Incarceration Without Confrontation: An
In-Depth Look At Commonwealth v. Ricker
Courtney M. Kenyon*
ABSTRACT

A preliminary hearing is a matter of great public importance
because it secures the right to be free from erroneous incarceration.
Without a fair and impartial process for determining whether or not
probable cause exists to support the charges brought, an accused could be
imprisoned or made to enter bail unjustly. In Commonwealth v. Ricker,
the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that the prosecution could establish
a prima facie case against the defendant based solely on hearsay
evidence at the preliminary hearing. Additionally, the court determined
that the presentation of such hearsay evidence did not violate the
defendant's constitutional rights under the Confrontation Clause.
However, both the United States Constitution and the Pennsylvania
Constitution bestow individual rights to citizens during all criminal
prosecutions, not just at trial.
This Comment first analyzes the text of the Confrontation Clause
provisions of the state and federal constitutions as well as the intent of
the Framers in ratifying the Constitution. Next, this Comment discusses
the critical nature of preliminary hearings in the criminal adjudicatory
process, illustrated by the triggering of other individual rights
enumerated in the Sixth Amendment at this stage, including the right to
counsel. This Comment then explains why a defendant, who has not had
the chance to meet his accusers before trial, has been handicapped by
Pennsylvania's process.
Finally, this Comment will describe the
impediments created by the Pennsylvania Superior Court's erroneous
decision of Ricker and will further suggest that defendants may have
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more success in the future by arguing that their procedural due process
rights have been violated.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The failure of a state to provide a fair process for ascertaining the
truth at the preliminary hearing stage is a matter of significant public
importance.' An individual has considerable interest in a preliminary
hearing because its main function is to protect an accused from unlawful

1. See Commonwealth v. Ricker, 120 A.3d 349, 354 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015) ("Not
only is Appellant's claim capable of evading review, it presents an important
constitutional question regarding whether a powerful state governmental entity violates
federal and state constitutional principles in allowing a defendant to be restrained of his
liberty and bound over for trial based solely on hearsay evidence.").
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arrest and detention.2 Preliminary hearings are a vital part of the
adjudicative process. Preliminary hearings seek to prevent a defendant
from being imprisoned or being forced to enter bail for a crime that was
never committed or for a crime in which the prosecution fails to present
evidence of a defendant's involvement. 3 Therefore, without a fair
preliminary hearing, an individual could be incarcerated or made to enter
bail unjustly.4

In Commonwealth v. Ricker,s the Pennsylvania Superior Court held
that the use of solely hearsay evidence 6 to establish a prima facie case
against the defendant in a preliminary hearing did not violate the
confrontation clauses of the federal or state constitutions.7 Historically,
one of the primary reasons for excluding hearsay testimony is the lack of
cross-examination, a mechanism used to cast light on the facts of a case
and expose truth.8
Moreover, the unavailability of witnesses at
preliminary hearings deprives defendants of a chance to obtain testimony
that could be used to impeach the witnesses at trial, and thereby
handicaps defendants' ability to present a defense. 9 Other risks are also
associated with the admission of hearsay evidence, including inaccuracy
and deception.10 Although the issue presented in Ricker is of great public
importance and involves the safeguarding of basic human rights, it often
2. See Commonwealth v. Mullen, 333 A.2d 755, 757 (Pa. 1975) (citing
Commonwealth ex rel. Maisenhelder v. Rundle, 198 A.2d 565 (Pa. 1964) ("The
[preliminary] hearing's principal function is to protect an individual's right against
unlawful detention.").
3. Commonwealth v: Rashed, 436 A.2d 134, 137 (Pa. 1981) (quoting
Maisenhelder, 198 A.2d at 567).
4. See id.
5. Commonwealth v. Ricker, 120 A.3d 349 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015).
6. PA.R.E. 801 (defining hearsay as an out-of-court statement offered to prove the
truth of the matter asserted).
7. See Ricker, 120 A.3d at 355.
8. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51-52 (1987) ("[T]he right to
cross-examine includes the opportunity to show that a witness is biased, or that the
testimony is exaggerated or unbelievable."); see also Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269
(1959) ("The jury's estimate of the truthfulness and reliability of a given witness may
well be determinative of guilt or innocence, and it is upon such subtle factors as the
possible interest of the witness in testifying falsely that a defendant's life or liberty may
depend."); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965) (reasoning that cross-examination
is necessary to protect a defendant in a criminal case).
9. See Commonwealth v. Redshaw, 323 A.2d 92, 94 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1974) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Brabham, 309 A.2d 824, 827 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1973)) (citing Coleman
v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9 (1970)) ("[T]he skilled interrogation of witnesses by an
experienced lawyer [at the preliminary hearing] can fashion a vital impeachment tool for
use in cross-examination of the State's witnesses at the trial . . . ."); see also Ritchie, 480
U.S. at 61-62 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("In my view, there might well be a
confrontation violation if, as here, a defendant is denied pretrial access to information
that would make possible effective cross-examination of a crucial prosecution witness.").
10. See infra notes 55-61 and accompanying text.
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evades the courts' review because once a defendant is either acquitted or
convicted at trial, problems that occurred at the preliminary hearing stage
become moot."
Although the court in Ricker determined that the defendant's
Confrontation Clause rights were not violated, precedent supports a
different determination. 12 The Pennsylvania Superior Court instead
should have held that, although the rules of evidence have not
traditionally been applied with the same rigor during the preliminary
hearing stage, 13 establishing a prima facie case against a defendant based
on hearsay alone is unconstitutional.14
A plain reading of both the federal and state confrontation clauses,
as well as the Framers' intent in drafting them, leads to the conclusion
that the right of confrontation applies during the entirety of a criminal
prosecution, and not just at trial." The time from the arraignment until
trial is a crucial time in a criminal proceeding.' 6 The right of defendants

11. See infra note 137 and accompanying text.
12. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576 (2008) (adopting a
textualist approach to interpret the meaning of the United States Constitution); Ritchie,
480 U.S. at 61-62 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (rejecting the notion that a defendant's
right to confrontation has no relevance pretrial); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 120
(1975) (reasoning that the pretrial presentation of witness testimony and full exploration
of it on cross-examination is important); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9 (1970)
(holding that the preliminary hearing is such a critical stage as to constitutionally require
the assistance of counsel); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205 (1964) (defining
the time from the arraignment until trial as a crucial time in a criminal proceeding);
Commonwealth ex rel. Buchanan v. Verbonitz, 581 A.2d 172, 175 (Pa. 1990) (plurality)
(holding that a prima facie case had not been established where only hearsay evidence
had been presented at the preliminary hearing); Commonwealth v. Nieves, 876 A.2d 423,
427 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (reasoning that a prima facie case had been correctly
established where the police officer also testified as to what he observed first hand and
not just what he had heard another say); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 849 A.2d 1254, 1257
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) (determining that a prima facie case existed where more than just
hearsay evidence was offered with regards to every element of the charges);
Commonwealth v. Carmody, 799 A.2d 143, 146 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (stating that the
use of solely hearsay testimony fails to meet the criteria for evidence upon which the
preliminary hearing judge may rely); Commonwealth v. Tyler, 587 A.2d 326, 328 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1991) (distinguishing the Buchanan case and holding that a prima facie case
had been established where more than hearsay evidence had been offered to support each
element of each offense charged).
13. PA. R. CluM. P. 542 cmt.
14. See supra note 12.
15. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also PA. CONST. art. I, § 9; Commonwealth v.
Ricker, 120 A.3d 349, 363 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015) ("We acknowledge that one of the
primary harms sought to be remedied by the federal and Pennsylvania Confrontation
Clause was the English practice of using statements taken pre-trial to establish guilt at
trial without affording the accused an opportunity to cross-examine the witness. Thus,
the very reason for the constitutional right was because an accused could not confront
those witnesses during the earlier proceedings.") (emphasis added).
16. Massiah, 377 U.S. at 205 (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932)).
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to confront the witnesses against them should be applied with the same
exactitude during preliminary hearings as are other fundamental
constitutional rights, such as the right to counsel.
If defendants are
unable to obtain their accusers' pre-trial statements, they may be
deprived of valuable impeachment evidence which creates a significant
impediment on their ability to conduct an effective cross-examination at
trial.18
Thus, Ricker weakens the protections provided by the
Confrontation Clause. 19 Finally, the outcome reached by the Ricker
court denies the accused of a right to procedural due process.2 0
H.

BACKGROUND

A.

The PreliminaryHearing
In 1915, Pennsylvania first enacted a statute requiring, if a

defendant elected, preliminary hearings for certain crimes; although, the
case law already recognized preliminary hearings as a right belonging to
every individual. 21
Interpreting this statute, Judge Beck of the
Pennsylvania Superior Court stated that a preliminary hearing constitutes
a "positive legal right" of an accused.22 Defendants have an interest in a
preliminary hearing because it is a vital and integral part of the criminal
adjudicative process.23 In fact, the principal function of a preliminary
hearing is to protect an individual's right to be free from unlawful arrest
24
and detention.
use of such
sh1 a hearing seeks to prevent an accused

17.

See generally Coleman, 399 U.S. 1.

18. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 61-62 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
19. Id. at 71 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
20. See infra notes 271-73 and accompanying text.
21. The law was referred to as the Act of May 14, 1915 and codified at 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 1080 (1915); Commonwealth v. Brabham, 309 A.2d 824, 825 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1973) ("[U]pon a preliminary hearing before a magistrate for the purpose of
determining whether a person charged with any crime or misdemeanor against the laws,
except murder, manslaughter, arson, rape, mayhem, sodomy, buggery, robbery, or
burglary, ought to be committed for trial, the person accused, and all persons on behalf of
the person accused, shall be heard if the person accused shall so demand."); see also In re
Petition of Daily Item, 456 A.2d 580, 584 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (Beck, J., concurring).
22. Daily Item, 456 A.2d at 825 (citing Commonwealth v. Hoffman, 152 A.2d 726,
729 (Pa. 1959)); see also Commonwealth ex rel. Fitzpatrick v. Mirarchi, 392 A.2d 1346,
1349 (Pa. 1978) ("An accused in Pennsylvania, with certain exceptions, has the right to a
preliminary hearing.").
23. See Daily Item, 456 A.2d at 584.
24. See Commonwealth v. McBride, 595 A.2d 589, 591 (Pa. 1991) (citing
Commonwealth v. Mullen, 333 A.2d 755, 757 (Pa. 1975)) ("The principal function of a
preliminary hearing is to protect an individual's right against an unlawful arrest and
detention").
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from being imprisoned or made to enter bail for a crime for which there
exists no evidence of his or her connection.2 5
Although preliminary hearings are considered part of the adversarial
process, 26 they are not trials. 27 They are often conducted in front of a
magisterial district

judge, 28 instead of a Court of Common Pleas judge,

and in a magisterial district court instead of a Court of Common Pleas. 2 9
At a preliminary hearing, the Commonwealth bears the burden to
establish a prima facie case against the defendant, that is, to provide
evidence supporting each material element of the alleged offense(s) so as
to show that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably
the one who committed it.30 Of course, mere speculation that the
defendant was involved in a crime is insufficient to establish a prima
facie case; 31 however, the evidence that the Commonwealth presents
during a preliminary hearing "need only be such that, if presented at trial
and accepted as true, the judge would be warranted in permitting the case
to be decided by the jury." 32
If the Commonwealth fails to establish a prima facie case against
the defendant, he or she will be discharged by the issuing authority. 33 In
contrast, when a prima facie case is established, the defendant will be
25. Commonwealth v. Rashed, 436 A.2d 134, 137 (Pa. 1981).
26. Commonwealth ex rel. Buchanan v. Verbonitz, 581 A.2d 172, 175 (Pa. 1990)
("A preliminary hearing is an adversarialproceeding which is a critical stage in a
criminal prosecution.") (emphasis added); see also see ERWIN CHERMERINSKY & LAURIE
L. LEVENSON, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: ADJUDICATION 61 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 2d ed.

2013).
27. McBride, 595 A.2d at 591.
28. The two types of judges are distinct. A magisterial district judge need not have
attended law school, obtained a Juris Doctor, or be a member of the Commonwealth's
bar. See Pa.R.J.A. No. 601(a). Court of Common Pleas judges "shall be members of the
bar of the Supreme Court." See PA. CONST. art. V, § 12.
29. The size of a magisterial district is determined by population and population
density, and each district has one magisterial district court headed by one magisterial
district judge. See PA. CONST. art. V, § 7. In contrast, there is one Court of Common
Pleas in each judicial district of the Commonwealth that is presided over by the number
of judges allowed by law to include one president judge. See PA. CONST. art. V, § 5.
30. Id. See also Commonwealth v. Karetny, 880 A.2d 505, 514 (Pa. 2005)
(reasoning that a prima facie case exists "when the Commonwealth produces evidence of
each of the material elements of the crime charged and establishes probable cause to
warrant the belief that the accused committed the offense").
31. See McBride, 595 A.2d at 591 (citing generally Commonwealth v. Wojdak, 466
A.2d 991 (Pa. 1983)).
32. Karetny, 880 A.2d at 514; see also McBride, 595 A.2d at 591 ("It is not
necessary for the Commonwealth to establish at this stage the accused's guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.").
33. PA. R. CRIM. P. 542(D); PA. R. CRIM. P. 543(B). For the definition of "issuing
authority," see PA. R. CRIM. P. 103 ("Issuing Authority is any public official having the
power and authority of a magistrate, a Philadelphia arraignment court magistrate, or a
magisterial district judge.").
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held over for court.34 During the preliminary hearing stage, rules of
evidence are not always applied with full rigor.3 5 However, problems
and risks may arise when using certain types of evidence, including
hearsay tdstimony, during any phase of a criminal prosecution.3 6
B.

Problems with the Use ofHearsayEvidence
. 1.

Reasons to Exclude Hearsay Evidence

Scholars and courts often offer three reasons to exclude hearsay
from witness testimony. 37 As a general principle, courts express a
preference for live testimony over out-of-court statements.38
The first and most important reason to exclude hearsay is that
opposing counsel cannot cross-examine the declarant. 39 Absent crossexamination, the out-of-court statement presented as evidence on which
the trier of fact will most likely rely has, not been subjected to this vital
"truth-testing technique."40
The second reason a court should exclude hearsay evidence is the
absence of demeanor evidence. 4 1 At the time the out-of-court declarant

34.

PA. R. CRIM. P. 543(B).

35.

PA. R. CRIM. P. 542 cmt.

36.

See infra notes 37-63 and accompanying text.

37.

CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE UNDER THE

RULES: TEXT, CASES, AND PROBLEMS 112 (Erwin Chemerinsky et al. eds., 8th ed. 2015);
see also Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845-46 (1990) ("[T]he right guaranteed by the
Confrontation Clause includes not only a personal examination, but also (1) insures that
the witness will give his statements under oath-thus impressing him with the
seriousness of the matter and guarding against the lie by the possibility of a penalty for
perjury; (2) forces the witness to submit to cross-examination, the greatest legal engine
ever invented for the discovery of truth; [and] (3) permits the jury that is to decide the
defendant's fate to observe the demeanor of the witness in making his statement, thus
aiding the jury in assessing his credibility.").
38. See Craig, 497 U.S. at 846 ("The combined effect of these elements of
confrontation . . serves the purposes of the Confrontation Clause by ensuring that
evidence admitted against an accused is reliable and subject to the rigorous adversarial
testing that is the norm of Anglo-American criminal proceedings.").
39. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9 (1970) (suggesting that crossexamination is vital to the accused); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965)
("Moreover, the decisions of this Court and other courts throughout the years have
constantly emphasized the necessity for cross-examination as a protection for defendants
in criminal cases."); see also MUELLER, supra note 37, at 112.
40. See Pointer, 380 U.S. at 404 ("And probably no one, certainly no one
experienced in the trial of lawsuits, would deny the value of cross-examination in
exposingfalsehood and bringing out the truth in the trial of a criminal case.") (emphasis
added); see also MUELLER, supra note 37, at 112.
41. See Craig, 497 U.S. at 845 ("[C]ompelling him to stand face to face with the
jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and
the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief(.]") (quoting
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makes the statement that is later brought into court, the declarant is not
under the gaze of the trier of fact.42 Therefore, the use of hearsay
deprives factfinders of the opportunity to consider the speaker's voice
inflection, expression, and overall demeanor when assessing the
credibility of the declarant's statement.43
The third reason for excluding hearsay evidence is the absence of an
oath or affirmation." Because the declarant was likely not under oath
when he made the statement outside of court, no indication exists that the
speaker was under any moral or legal obligation to speak the truth.45 Of
course, the witness on the stand is under oath, but it is the out-of-court
statement, made in the absence of the oath, upon which the trier of fact
will ultimately rely. 46 If a court does admit hearsay evidence despite
these fallbacks, risks arise, which in turn may affect the reliability of the
proceeding's outcome.47
2.

Risks Created by Admitting Hearsay Evidence

Scholars and courts associate four risks of witness inaccuracy with
the admission of out-of-court statements.4 8 The first risk is one of
misperception, which is a function of sensory and mental capacity as

Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895)); see also MUELLER, supra note

37, at 112.
42. MUELLER, supra note 37, at 112.
43. Id. See also Craig, 497 U.S. at 846-47 (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56,
63 n.6 (1980)) ("That face-to-face presence may, unfortunately, upset the truthful rape
victim or abused child; but by the same token it may confound and undo the false
accuser, or reveal the child coached by a malevolent adult.").
44. See Pa.R.E. 603; 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5901(a)-(b) (1978) ("The affirmation
may be administered in any judicial proceeding instead of the oath, and shall have the
same effect and consequences, and any witness who desires to affirm shall be permitted
to do so."); see also MUELLER, supra note 37, at 113.
45. Pa.R.E. 603 ("Before testifying, a witness must give an oath or affirmation to
testify truthfully. It must be in a form designed to impress that duty on the witness's
conscience."); see also MUELLER, supra note 37, at 113.
46. MUELLER, supra note 37, at 113; see also supra note 45.
47. See Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959) ("The jury's estimate of the
truthfulness and reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or
innocence, and it is upon such subtle factors as the possible interest of the witness in
testifying falsely that a defendant's life or liberty may depend."); see also MUELLER,
supra note 37, at 113.
48. MUELLER, supra note 37, at 113; see also JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET B.
BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE MANUAL § 14.04(2) (9th ed. 2011); Schering Corp. v.
Pfizer, Inc., 189 F.3d 218, 232 (2d Cir. 1999) ("The hearsay rule is generally said to
exclude out-of-court statements offered for the truth of the matter asserted because there
are four classes of risk peculiar to this kind of evidence: those of (1) insincerity, (2) faulty
perception, (3) faulty memory and (4) faulty narration, each of which decreases the
reliability of the inference from the statement made to the conclusion for which it is
offered.").
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well as physical circumstance and psychological condition.4 9 This risk is
based on the premise that even well-situated witnesses, who have
excellent senses, may misinterpret or misunderstand what they
perceive.50
The second risk of admitting such statements is faulty memory.
The more time that elapses between a witness's original observation of
an event and their appearance in court, the greater chance those memory
problems may arise.5 2 Cross-examination may be useful in highlighting
the uncertainties associated with this faulty memory. 53
The third risk is misstatement, also referred to as the risk of
"ambiguity" or "faulty narration."54 This inaccuracy occurs when the
witness meant to say something outside of court, but misspoke.55 As to
this risk, cross-examination is often useful to cure any disparities
between statements and intent and achieve clarity as to what the witness
really intended to say.56 Moreover, the oath administered at a hearing or
trial reminds witnesses of the need to speak with care when testifying.57
Finally, the use of hearsay poses the risk of intentional or
unintentional distortion by the witness. 58 The distortion of facts can be
subconscious or calculated and intended to fool the trier of fact.5 9 The
courtroom environment, paired with the oath to testify truthfully, are

49.

See Semieraro v. Commonwealth Util. Equip. Corp., 544 A.2d 46, 47 (Pa. 1988)

(quoting Johnson v. Peoples Cab Co., 126 A.2d 720, 721 (Pa. 1956) ("However, with
such a pen-and-ink procedure, there would be no opportunity to check on testimonial
defects such as fallacious memory, limited observation, purposeful distortions, and
outright fabrication.")); see also MUELLER, supra note 37, at 113.
50. MUELLER, supra note 37, at 113.
51. See supra notes 48-49.
52. Pa.R.E. 803(1) cmt. ("The trustworthiness of the statement arises from its
timing. The requirement of contemporaneousness, or near contemporaneousness, reduces
the chance of premeditated prevarication or loss of memory.") (emphasis added); see also
FED. R. EvID. 803 advisory committee's note to 1973 amendment (citing Owens v. State,
10 A. 210, 212 (1887) ("The guarantee of trustworthiness is found in the reliability
inherent in a record made while events were still fresh in minds and accurately reflecting
them.")); see also MUELLER, supra note 37, at 113.
53. Semieraro, 544 A.2d at 47 ("The great engine of cross-examination would lie
unused while error and perjury would travel untrammeledly to an unreliable and oftentainted judgment."); see also MUELLER, supra note 37, at 114; see also supra notes 3740.
54. MUELLER, supra note 37, at 114.
55. Id. See also supra note 48.
56. Id. See also supra notes 37-40, 53.
57. MUELLER, supra note 37, at 114; see also supra note 45.
58. See FED. R. EviD. 803 advisory committee's note to 1973 amendment ("The
underlying theory of Exception [paragraph] (1) is that substantial contemporaneity of
event and statement negative the likelihood of deliberate [or] conscious
misrepresentation.").
59. MUELLER, supra note 37, at 114.
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ordinarily safeguards that suppress the witnesses' aims to deceive.o
Further, the visible demeanor of the witness on the stand may alert the
trier of fact to deception, and cross-examination may expose
subconscious distortion and lies.61
Hearsay evidence has long been admitted in preliminary hearings in
Pennsylvania,62 but, without more, hearsay has not been sufficient to
establish a prima facie case against the defendant. 63
C.

PennsylvaniaLaw Before PA. R. CRIM. P. 542 (E) andRicker

1.
Ricker

Earlier Cases Analyzing Similar Issues to Those Presented in

When determining why a court ruled the way it did on a particular
issue, one must first look at the state of the law when the court was
making its decision." In Pennsylvania, there are several cases that
discuss the use of hearsay evidence in preliminary hearings. This issue
often evades the court's review.6 6
It is clear that pre-Ricker,
Pennsylvania courts understood hearsay evidence to be admissible at
preliminary hearings. However, it was admissible only to corroborate
other non-hearsay evidence, and was not alone sufficient to establish a
prima facie case.68
In Commonwealth ex rel. Buchanan v. Verbonitz,6 9 the issue was
whether hearsay evidence, presented at a preliminary hearing as the sole
evidence against the accused, was sufficient to establish a prima facie
60. See Pa.R.E. 603; see also Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1019 (1988) ("It is
always more difficult to tell a lie about a person 'to his face' than 'behind his back."').
61. See Coy, 487 U.S. at 1019 ("[E]ven if the lie is told, it will often be told less
convincingly. The Confrontation Clause does not, of course, compel the witness to fix
his eyes upon the defendant; he may studiously look elsewhere, but the trier of fact will
draw its own conclusions."); see also MUELLER, supra note 37, at 114.
62. See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
63. See infra note 68 and accompanying text.
64. See Commonwealth v. Porter, 728 A.2d 890, 901 (Pa. 1999) (reasoning that
because the state of the law at the time of trial was such that a certain charge was
explicitly forbidden, the trial court did not err in not raising the charge sua sponte).
65. Commonwealth v. Ricker, 120 A.3d 349, 355 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015); see supra
notes 26-47 and accompanying text.
66. See infra note 138 and accompanying text.
67.. See Commonwealth v. Troop, 571 A.2d 1084, 1088 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) ("In
light of the critical nature of the preliminary hearing in assuring that the state has a legal
basis for prosecuting a person, the better course may be for the state, whenever possible,
to produce evidence to establish its prima facie case that would also be admissible at trial.
However, there is no requirement that the state do so in all instances.").
68. Ricker, 120 A.3d at 355 ("Prior to the promulgation of the applicable version of
Rule 542(E), hearsay evidence was admissible at a preliminary hearing, but several cases
indicated it could not solely be used to establish a prima facie case.").
69. Commonwealth ex rel. Buchanan v. Verbonitz, 581 A.2d 172 (Pa. 1990).
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case. 70 In Buchanan, the only evidence offered by the Commonwealth at
the preliminary hearing was the testimony of a police officer relaying
what he was told by a third-party victim.7n The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held that the Commonwealth failed to establish the prima facie
case against the defendant.7 2 Writing for the plurality of the court,
Justice Larsen stated: "Fundamental due process requires that no
adjudication be based solely on hearsay evidence. If more than 'rank
hearsay' is required in an administrative context, the standard must be
higher in a criminal proceeding where a person may be deprived of his
liberty."73 Additionally, the Buchanan court stated that a criminal
defendant has a right, secured by the Pennsylvania and United States
constitutions, as well as the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure,
to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him.7 4 The court
further reasoned that the evidence offered by the Commonwealth was
inadmissible hearsay and did not constitute legally competent evidence."
A few months later, in Commonwealth v. Tyler, the Pennsylvania
Superior Court interpreted and distinguished Buchanan.77 It reasoned
that "[i]f the hearsay testimony offered at the preliminary hearing is the
only basis for establishing a prima facie case, it fails to meet the criteria
for evidence upon which the preliminary hearing judge may rely." 78 In
Tyler, the court was satisfied that a prima facie existed where the
Commonwealth had used non-hearsay evidence to establish its case
against the defendant.79
70. Id. at 173.
71. See id.
72. Id. (holding that hearsay evidence alone may not be the basis for establishing a
prima facie case).
73. Id (quoting Commonwealth, Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review v. Ceja, 427
A.2d 631, 647 (Pa. 1981) (Flaherty, J., dissenting)).
74. Id. at 174.
75. Id. (reasoning that the reliance on such evidence violated the defendant's
Confrontation Clause rights afforded to him by both the Pennsylvania and United States
constitutions); see also PA. CONST. art. 1, § 9; cf Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970)
(holding that preliminary hearings are a "critical stage" of the prosecution so as to
constitutionally require representation by counsel). But cf Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480
U.S. 39 (1987) (stating that the right to confrontation is "basically a trial right").
76. Commonwealth v. Tyler, 587 A.2d 326 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
77. Id. at 328 ("[Buchanan] is inapposite here for three reasons. First, there was
more than hearsay evidence to establish the prima facie case in the present situation.
Second, a trial followed in the present case, during which guilt was established beyond a
reasonable doubt, whereas in Buchanan, a direct appeal resulted from the trial court's
denial of a petition for habeas corpus before trial. Third, appellant has failed
procedurally to preserve his claim in proceeding to trial instead of taking a direct appeal
from the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, as was done in Buchanan.").
78. Commonwealth v. Ricker, 120 A.3d 349, 355 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015) (citing
Commonwealth v. Tyler, 587 A.2d 326, 328-29 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991)).
79. See Tyler, 587 A.2d at 328.
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In Commonwealth v. Carmody,so the habeas court dismissed the
defendant's charge of terroristic threats because the charge was
supported exclusively by a written statement that the court deemed
hearsay evidence. 8 ' The Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed this
decision only because the written document fell within the prior
inconsistent statement exception to the hearsay doctrine.82
Other cases since Carmody have similarly followed the premise that
hearsay evidence, although admissible in a preliminary hearing, cannot
be used as the sole evidence to establish the prima facie case against the
defendant.83 In Commonwealth v. Jackson,8 4 the court stated that "[i]n
the instant case, there was more than enough non-hearsay evidence to
establish a prima facie case." 85 Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Nieves,86
the court determined that because the police officer had actually
observed the commission of the offense, there was more than just
hearsay evidence and the prima facie case had been appropriately
established.

In Pennsylvania, the aforementioned precedent remained
unquestioned until the addition and promulgation of a new rule of
criminal procedure.
2.
542(E)

The Addition of Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure

Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 5429 establishes the
procedural rules that govern preliminary hearings. 90 The aforementioned
case law was decided before Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure
542(E) was promulgated or amended.9 ' Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal
Procedure 542(E) states:

80. Commonwealth v. Carmody, 799 A.2d 143 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002).
81. See id at 146.
82. Id. at 148.
83. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Jackson, 849 A.2d 1254, 1257 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2004); see generally Commonwealth v. Nieves, 876 A.2d 423 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005).
84. Commonwealth v. Jackson, 849 A.2d 1254 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004).
85. Id. at 1257 (citing Commonwealth v. Tyler, 587 A.2d 326, 328 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1991)).
86. Commonwealth v. Nieves, 876 A.2d 423 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005).
87. Id. at 427 (distinguishing the case from Buchanan, 581 A.2d 172, where the
evidence was merely a reiteration of what a third party victim had told police).
88. See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
89. PA. R. CliM. P. 542.
90. See generally id.
91. Commonwealth v. Ricker, 120 A.3d 349, 355 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015); see also 41
Pa. Bull. 834 (2011) (Section (E) was added to Rule 542 on January 27, 2011, effective in
30 days.); see also 43 Pa. Bull. 2562 (2013) (Section (E) was amended to reflect its
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Hearsay as provided by law shall be considered by the issuing
authority in determining whether a prima facie case has been
established. Hearsay evidence shall be sufficient to establish any
element of an offence, including, but not limited to, those requiring
proof of the ownership of, non-permitted use of, damage to, or value
of property.92
Additionally, the Ricker court looked to the Comment in Section (E)
of the rule. 93 The Comment states that Section (E) was revised to
reiterate that the laws of evidence have traditionally not been applied in
full rigor in all criminal proceedings, including preliminary hearings. 94
At issue in Commonwealth v. Ricker was whether the new Rule
542(E) changed the law by allowing hearsay evidence alone to establish
a prima facie case, and, if so, whether Rule 542(E) violates the
Confrontation Clause.95
D.

Analyzing Commonwealth v. Ricker96
1.

Procedural History

In Commonwealth v. Ricker, the district attorney charged David
Edward Ricker ("Ricker") with attempted murder, assault of a law
enforcement officer, and aggravated assault after he exchanged gunfire
with a Pennsylvania State Trooper. 9 7 On the evening of the incident,
Trooper Trotta, of the Pennsylvania State Police, responded to a dispatch
call in West Hanover Township concerning loud and fast driving.98
When Trooper Trotta arrived on the scene, he encountered a group
of people standing partially in the road at the end of a driveway. 99
Trooper Trotta pulled over, and the group pointed out a damaged

current reading on April 25, 2013, effective June 1, 2013); PA. R. CRiM. P. 542,
Committee Explanatory Reports.

92. PA. R. CluM. P. 542(E).
93. Ricker, 120 A.3d at 354.
94. PA. R. CRiM. P. 542 cmt.; but see generally Commonwealth ex rel. Buchanan v.
Verbonitz, 581 A.2d 172 (Pa. 1990) (determining that the sole use of hearsay to establish
a prima facie case during the preliminary hearing stage violates the Constitutional rights
of the accused).
95. See Ricker, 120 A.3d at 355 ("Prior to the promulgation of the applicable
version of Rule 542(E), hearsay evidence was admissible at a preliminary hearing, but
several cases indicated it could not solely be used to establish a prima facie case."); see
also infra note 131 and accompanying text.

96. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted Ricker's allowance of appeal on April
18, 2016. See Commonwealth v. Ricker, 135 A.3d 175 (Pa. 2016).
97. Ricker, 120 A.3d at 351.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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mailbox and lawn ornament sign. 100 They explained that the items had
been damaged when hit by a pickup truck driven by their neighbor, Mr.
Ricker; they directed Trooper Trotta to Ricker's driveway.o
Trooper Trotta arrived at Ricker's gated driveway and pressed a call
button. 102 Ricker's wife came to the end of the driveway and informed
Trooper Trotta that her husband was drunk and carrying a firearm.1 0 3
Although she hesitated at first, Ricker's wife eventually opened the
driveway gate, allowing the trooper to pull his vehicle to the top of the
driveway." At first, Trooper Trotta remained in his vehicle.105 He saw
Ricker emerge from the residence with a large German Shepherd. 106
When Trooper Trotta communicated with then-intoxicated Ricker,
informing Ricker that he was suspected of sideswiping his neighbor's
mailbox, Ricker became irate, cursed at Trooper Trotta, and demanded
that Trooper Trotta get off of Ricker's property. 0 7 Ricker's wife raised
her voice to her husband. Ricker then struck her and pushed her aside. 0
Upon this observation, Trooper Trotta attempted to exit his vehicle and
began to draw his taser.' 09 Ricker slammed the door of the police cruiser
shut and reached inside the vehicle in an attempt to grab the taser. 11 0
Ricker's wife again interceded, and Trooper Trotta was finally able to
exit his police cruiser."' Upon exiting, Trooper Trotta observed Ricker
remove a small gun from the back of his pants; Trooper Trotta drew his
weapon and called for backup.11 2 Still waving his firearm, Ricker
proceeded toward his house and disappeared into an open three-car
garage bay.' 13
Soon thereafter, Trooper Gingerich arrived on the scene and ordered
Ricker to come out and show his hands.11 4 At this point, Trooper Trotta
observed Ricker now holding an assault rifle and demanded that he drop
it." 5 Instead, Ricker aimed the weapon at Trooper Trotta. Trotta opened

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id
Id. at 351-52.
Id. at 351.
Ricker, 120 A.3d at 352.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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fire and struck Ricker twice.1 16 As Ricker fell to the ground, he returned
fire, hitting Trooper Trotta multiple times.' 17
Despite being the Commonwealth's only eyewitnesses to the events
in question, neither Trooper Trotta nor Trooper Gingerich testified at
Ricker's preliminary hearing.' 8 Instead, Trooper Kelley testified about
his subsequent investigation of the incident where he had conducted a
taped interview of Trooper Trotta recounting the events in question. 119
Despite Trooper Trotta's absence from the preliminary hearing, the
Commonwealth sought, through Trooper Kelley, to play Trooper Trotta's
taped interview for the magistrate judge to provide evidence sufficient to
establish a prima facie case.120 Ricker objected to the hearsay evidence
and also requested a continuance in order to afford himself an
opportunity to call Trooper Trotta and Trooper Gingerich on his
behalf. 12 1 The magisterial district court judge admitted the hearsay
evidence, rejected Ricker's request for a continuance, and bound the
charges over 22 for trial. 2 3 Consequently, Ricker filed a pre-trial writ of
habeas corpus,124 but the trial court denied it without a hearing or
presentation of argument.1 25 Accordingly, Ricker filed an interlocutory
appeal1 26 against the trial court's denial of habeas corpus relief,
maintaining that it was improper to12 7find a prima facie case against him
based entirely on hearsay evidence.
2.

The Issues Presented in Ricker

On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court identified three main
issues for its consideration. 128 Preliminarily, the court had to decide
whether it "should hear this interlocutory appeal from the denial of

116. Id.
117. Ricker, 120 A.3d at 352.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See PA. R. CRIM. P. 543(B) ("If the issuing authority finds that the
Commonwealth has established a prima facie case that an offense has been committed
and the defendant has committed it, the issuing authority shall hold the defendant for
court on the offense(s) on which the Commonwealth established a prima facie case.");
see also supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
123. Ricker, 120 A.3d at 352.
124. See Commonwealth v. Orman, 408 A.2d 518, 519 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979) ("The
proper means for testing the validity of a district justice's determination is for an accused
in custody to file a writ of habeas corpus.").
125. Ricker, 120 A.3d at 352.
126. See infra notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
127. Ricker, 120 A.3d at 352.
128. See id. at 353.
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appellant's habeas corpus petition under the 'exceptional
or
extraordinary' circumstances exception to the general rule because it
entails a matter of great public interest."1 2 9 If the court in Ricker found
that it had reason to consider the defendant's appeal, it then would turn to
the other two issues. 130 The first of these two issues was "[w]hether the
Commonwealth may prove a prima facie case at the preliminary hearing
exclusively through hearsay evidence," which is what the trial and
magisterial district courts permitted in Ricker's case. 13 1 If the Superior
Court concluded that the Commonwealth could prove a prima facie case
with only hearsay evidence based on Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal
Procedure 542(E), then it would turn to the final issue of whether the rule
violates the state and federal constitutional confrontation rights of
defendants and long-standing Pennsylvania and U.S. Supreme Court
precedent. 132 In order to fully understand the court's reasoning in Ricker,
the parties' arguments must be examined.
3.

The Parties' Arguments

First, Ricker urged the court to find that it had jurisdiction over his
interlocutory appeal. 133 Usually, when a court denies a pre-trial writ of
habeas corpus, it is not appealable. 134 However, an interlocutory appeal
may be considered where exceptional circumstances exist. 13 5 Ricker
contended that exceptional circumstances exist when "(1) the question
involved is capable of repetition but likely to evade review or; (2) the
question involved is one of public importance." 3 6 Ricker first noted that
once a defendant is either acquitted or convicted at trial, problems that
occurred at the preliminary hearing stage become moot. 13 7 Therefore,
Ricker argued that the procedural issues, such as using hearsay evidence
to establish a prima facie case, were likely to evade the review of the

129. Id. See generally Commonwealth v. Hess, 414 A.2d 1043 (Pa. 1980)
(establishing the "exceptional" circumstances exception to the interlocutory appeal).
130. See Ricker, 120 A.3d at 353..
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id See also Hess, 414 A.2d at 1047-48; Commonwealth v. Jackson, 849 A.2d
1254 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004).
135. Hess, 414 A.2d at 1047-48 ("Where exceptional circumstances exist, an appeal
from such an interlocutory order may be considered.").

136. Ricker, 120 A.3d at 353 (citing Commonwealth v. Bernhardt, 519 A.2d 417, 420
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1986)); see also Commonwealth v. Smith, 486 A.2d 445, 448 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1984); In re Estate of Dorone, 502 A.2d 1271, 1274 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
137. Ricker, 120 A.3d at 353 (citing Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 82 A.3d 943, 984
(Pa. 2013)) ("Indeed, once a defendant has gone to trial and has been found guilty of the
crime or crimes charged, any defect in the preliminary hearing is rendered immaterial.").
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court and risk repetition. 13 He observed that the question at issue in
Ricker was one of first impression and an "issue of great public
importance and the safeguarding of basic human rights."l 39
Next, Ricker contended that, even after the addition of Section (E),
hearsay evidence was not sufficient to establish a prima facie case
against a defendant. 14 0 Ricker relied on the Superior Court's opinion in
Tyler, in which the court upheld the magisterial district court's holding
that a prima facie case existed when the prosecution presented more than
just hearsay evidence against the defendant. 14 1 Ricker also cited to the
Superior Court's footnote in Carmody, wherein it noted that, if hearsay
testimony is the only evidence presented at a preliminary hearing, the
Commonwealth fails to meet the criteria for evidence upon which the
judge may rely. 142 Finally, Ricker mentioned the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania's plurality decision in Buchanan, where the court reasoned
that a prima facie case could not be satisfied by hearsay evidence
alone.1 43
Ricker maintained that the magisterial district court violated his
state and federal Confrontation Clause rights by not allowing him to
cross-examine Trooper Trotta at his preliminary hearing. 1" Ricker
contended that, although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court promulgated
Rule 542, that fact is not dipositive of whether the Rule violates his
constitutional rights.1 45 In fact, Rule 542's Comment even states that the
Rule in conflict with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in
Buchanan.146

In response, the Commonwealth requested that the appeal be
quashed because Ricker was required to seek an interlocutory appeal by
permission. 14 7 It asserted that no extraordinary circumstances were
138. See Ricker, 120 A.3d at 353.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 355.
141. Id. See also Commonwealth v. Tyler, 587 A.2d 326., 328-29 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1991); supranotes 60-63 and accompanying text.
142. Ricker, 120 A.3d at 355; see Commonwealth v. Carmody, 799 A.2d 143, 146
n.2 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) ("[I]f the hearsay testimony offered at the preliminary hearing is
the only basis for establishing a prima facie case, it fails to meet the criteria for evidence
upon which the preliminary hearing judge may rely.") (citing Tyler, 587 A.2d 326 at
328.).
143. Ricker, 120 A.3d at 355 (citing the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's plurality
decision in Commonwealth ex rel. Buchanan v. Verbonitz, 581 A.2d 172 (Pa. 1990)).
144. See id. ("Appellant's view, allowing hearsay evidence alone to establish a prima
facie case of criminal wrongdoing renders a preliminary hearing 'an empty, ceremonial
formality in which the judge simply rubber stamps the uncross-examinable testimony of
the affiant[.]') (quoting Appellant's Br. at 40).
145. Id
146. See id. See also PA. R. CluM. P. 542 cmt.
147. Ricker, 120 A.3d at 354.
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present, as Ricker would still be allowed to confront the witnesses
against him at his trial. 14 8 Moreover, the Commonwealth urged that the
right to confrontation is a trial right and does not apply at the preliminary
hearing stage. 149
In response to the second and third issues raised by Ricker, the
Commonwealth sought to undermine Ricker's use of precedent. First,
the Commonwealth argued that, after the addition of Rule 542(E), a
magisterial district judge may find hearsay evidence alone is sufficient to
establish any element of the prima facie case against the defendant.so
The Commonwealth noted that the precedent cases on which Ricker
relied were all decided prior to the promulgation of Section (E) and that
the Buchanan case was only decided by a plurality of the court. 51
Further, the Commonwealth contended that, because the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court enacted the rule in question, it should be presumed
constitutional. 152
Subsequently, the Commonwealth disputed that the prima facie case
was built upon hearsay evidence alone,1 53 because more evidence,
including evidence of the victim's wounds, the seizure of marijuana, and
Rickers's own statements, was introduced to corroborate the hearsay
testimony. 154
Ultimately, the Superior Court agreed with the
Commonwealth, finding that hearsay alone was sufficient evidence to
establish a prima facie case at a preliminary hearing.155
4.

The Reasoning and Holding of the Ricker Court

The Superior Court first noted that the possibility of an issue
evading review does not alone establish extraordinary circumstances on
which to hear a case on interlocutory appeal.156 However, the court
ultimately determined that under the precise facts of Ricker, it did have
jurisdiction to consider Ricker's interlocutory appeal because the issue
featured in Ricker raised an important constitutional question.157
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 355.
151. Id. at 355-56.
152. Id. at 355.
153. See id at 356.
154. Id.
155. See infra note 168 and accompanying text.
156. See Ricker, 120 A.3d at 354 ("Thus, in order to establish exceptional
circumstances, more is required than the issue becoming moot.").
157. See id. ("Not only is Appellant's claim capable of evading review, it presents an
important constitutional question regarding whether a powerful state governmental entity
violates federal and state constitutional principles in allowing a defendant to be restrained
of his liberty and bound over for trial based solely on hearsay evidence.").
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After the court determined that it had jurisdiction, it considered the
preliminary issue of whether more than just hearsay evidence had been
presented to establish the prima facie case. 1 8 The court reasoned that,
although the Commonwealth had presented evidence other than hearsay
testimony, none of it was sufficient to establish the elements of the
crimes charged.' 5 9 The court stated, "Here, the evidence used to meet the
material elements of the crimes charged came from the taped statement
of Trooper Trotta."1 60 Thus, the court agreed with Ricker's assertion that
hearsay evidence alone was used by the Commonwealth to prove a prima
facie case for each of the offenses charged.1 6 1
The court proceeded to determine whether the use of hearsay
evidence alone could be used to establish a prima facie case under Rule
542(E).1 62 First, the court determined that the footnotel 63 that Ricker
relied upon in Carmody was mere dictum.'64 Second, the court stated
that the Tyler case did not actually support Ricker's position because the
Tyler court reasoned that Buchanan did not apply where non-hearsay
evidence established the prima facie case and Tyler did not appeal after
his habeas petition was denied by the court.1 65 Further, the Tyler court
had cursorily rejected a Confrontation Clause argument.166
Consequently, the court held that Rule 542(E) did not conflict with
any binding precedent.1 67 It stated that "[a] plain reading of the rule
indicates that it permits hearsay evidence to be considered in determining

158. See id. at 356.
159. See id. ("While the Commonwealth is correct that it introduced non-hearsay
evidence at the preliminary hearing, none of that evidence was sufficient to establish the
elements of the crimes charged. The seizure of weapons and marijuana was immaterial
to the charges. The fact that bullet casings were discovered also is insufficient.").
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Commonwealth v. Carmody, 799 A.2d 143, 146 n.2 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) ("[I]f
the hearsay testimony offered at the preliminary hearing is the only basis for establishing
a prima facie case, it fails to meet the criteria for evidence upon which the preliminary
hearing judge may rely.").
164. See Ricker, 120 A.3d at 356 ("The footnote was not necessary to the disposition
of the case since the hearsay in question was ultimately determined not to be inadmissible
hearsay. Accordingly, the Carmody footnote is dicta.").
165. Id. at 357.
166. Id. (citing Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987) (plurality), and setting
forth that the confrontation right is a trial right. "Thus, Tyler does not actually support
Appellant's hearsay or constitutional positions.").
167. Id.
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any material element of a crime."l68 The court found that Rule 542(E)
does allow hearsay evidence alone to establish a prima facie case. 69
Next, the court examined Ricker's claim that Section (E) violated
the Confrontation Clauses in both the federal and state constitutions.1 7 0
The Pennsylvania Constitution provides: "In all criminal prosecutions
the accused hath a right. . . to be confronted with the witnesses against
him[.]" 7 1 Similarly, the U.S. Constitution provides: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with
the witnesses against him[.]"l 72
In Ricker, the Superior Court stated that, when considering the
Pennsylvania Constitution, one should regard "spirit and intention" and
examine the "probable intent of the makers." 7 3 The Pennsylvania
Constitution must be interpreted in its popular sense at the time it was
adopted.1 74 The "ultimate touchstone" is the language of the Constitution
itself.17 5 Therefore, the words must be construed in their plain and
natural meaning, unless the words themselves denote a technical sense.1 76
The Ricker court believed that the Framers' probable intent in their
formation of the Confrontation Clause was to afford defendants a right to
confront their accusers at trial, and not before.1 77 During ratification of
the early Pennsylvania Constitution,1 78 preliminary hearings were held,

168. Id. PA. R. CRIM. P. 542(E) ("Hearsay as provided by law shall be considered by
the issuing authority in determining whether a prima facie case has been established.
Hearsay evidence shall be sufficient to establish any element of an offense.").
169.

See Ricker, 120 A.3d at 357 (reasoning "If hearsay evidence is sufficient to

.

establish one or more elements of the crime, it follows that, under the rule, it is sufficient
to meet all of the elements.").
170. See id. at 357-58.
171. PA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
172. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
173. Ricker, 120 A.3d at 358 (quoting Commonwealth v. Rose, 81 A.3d 123, 127
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2013)).
174. See id (citing Rose, 81 A.3d at 127).
175. Id. (citing Rose, 81 A.3d at 127).
176. See id. (quoting Monongahela Navigation Co. v. Coons, 6 Watts & Serg. 101,
114 (Pa. 1843) ("A constitution is made, not particularly for the inspection of lawyers,
but for the inspection of the million, that they may read and discern in it their rights and
their duties; and it is consequently expressed in the terms that are most familiar to them.
Words, therefore, which do not of themselves denote that they are used in a technical
sense, are to have their plain, popular, obvious, and natural meaning . .
177. Id. at 363.
178.
There have been various Pennsylvania Constitutional Conventions, the last of
which occurred in 1968. See Pennsylvania Constitution: Historical Research, DUQ.
UNIv., http://www.duq.edu/academics/gumberg-library/pa-constitution/historical-researc
h (last visited June 30, 2016). The current Article I, Section 9, and particularly the
Confrontation Clause found therein, was created in 2003. See 1968 Pennsylvania
Constitution, DuQ. UNIV., http://www.duq.edu/academics/gumberg-library/pa-constitut
ion/texts-of-the-constitution/l 968#A1 S09-2003 (last visited June 30, 2016).
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but not constitutionally mandated.17 9 The typical practice was that an
affidavit, usually written by a victim, would appear before a justice of the
peace. 80 The justice of the peace s8 would determine if a warrant would
be issued upon sufficient probable cause.1 8 2 After the accused was
arrested, the accused would be incarcerated, released on bail, or
discharged if the police lacked probable cause. 18 3 "Information gleaned
from these proceedings subsequently came to be used in criminal trials,
causing 'frequent demands by the prisoner to have his 'accusers,' i.e. the
witnesses against him, brought before him face to face.'" 1 4
The Ricker court cited to the holding185 in Commonwealth v.
O'Brien,18 6 wherein the defendant was not present for his preliminary
hearing.' 87 The Pennsylvania Superior Court did, however, acknowledge
that one of the primary harms that the adopters of both the federal and
state constitutions sought to cure was the "practice of using statements
taken pre-trial to establish guilt at trial without affording the accused an
opportunity to cross-examine the witness."
In sum, the Ricker court agreed with the Commonwealth's assertion
that the rule was presumed constitutional because the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania promulgated it.1 8 9 The Ricker court interpreted the federal
and state constitutions by looking to their text and determining the
probable intent of the Framers.1 90 Further, the court reasoned that it was
not bound by past precedents.1 91
Finally, the Ricker court compared preliminary hearings to grand
jury proceedings, where the accused does not have a right to
confrontation.1 9 2 In ruling against Ricker, the Pennsylvania Superior
179.
671 (Pa.
180.
181.
former

182.
183.
184.
185.

Ricker, 120 A.3d at 358 (citing Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 124 A.2d 666, 669Super. Ct. 1956)).
Id. at 359.
A justice of the peace and a magisterial district judge are synonymous; the
is an older title. See PA. CONST. art, V, § 7; see also supra notes 28-29.
Ricker, 120 A.3d at 359.
Id.
Id. at 358 (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43 (2004)).
See id. at 360 (quoting Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 124 A.2d 666, 674 (Pa.

Super. Ct. 1956) ("He has no constitutional right to face his accusers at a preliminary

hearing.")). But see Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 120 (1975) ("The importance of the
issue to both the States and the accused justifies the presentation of witnesses and full
exploration of their testimony on cross-examination.").

186.
187.

Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 124 A.2d 666 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1956).
Id. at 667.

188.
Ricker, 120 A.3d at 363 ("Thus, the very reason for the constitutional right was
because an accused could not confront those witnesses during the earlier proceedings.").

189.
190.
191.

See id at 362.
See id. at 363.
See id. at 361.

192.

See id at 363. But see CHERMERINSKY, supra note 26, at 61 ("A preliminary

hearing is fundamentally different from a grand jury proceeding. Preliminary hearings

296

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 121:1

Court held that his confrontation rights had not been violated and
affirmed the decision of the lower court. 19 3
Although the Superior Court of Pennsylvania conducted a thorough
and in-depth analysis of all the issues presented by Ricker, further
evidence suggests that the Confrontation Clause rights of the accused
were in fact violated and that the court reached an improper
conclusion.19 4
III. ANALYSIS
A.

The Confrontation Clause

1.
Clauses

Analyzing the Text of the Federal and State Confrontation

When interpreting the meaning of an individual's rights enumerated
in the Pennsylvania Constitution, courts must first consider the actual
language of the constitution itself. 195 The terms therein should be
construed to mean what laymen, not lawyers, would understand them to
mean at the time of the Constitution's adoption.1 96 Moreover, the United
States Supreme Court has stated that when interpreting the United States
Constitution, a court must first look to the text as it would be understood
by individual citizens.1 97 The words are to be understood in their
ordinary and plain meaning.1 98 Further, due regard should be afforded to
the Framers' intent in drafting the clauses found within the document's
text. 199

are more akin to 'mini-trials.' A judge presides over the preliminary hearing; it is an
adversarial process.").
193. See Ricker, 120 A.3d at 363-64.
194. See infra notes 195-262 and accompanying text.
195. See supra note 176 and accompanying text; see also infra note 198 and
accompanying text.
196. See Ricker, 120 A.3d at 358 (quoting Commonwealth v. Rose, 81 A.3d 123, 127
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2013)).
197. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576-77 (2008) (adopting a textual
analysis approach to interpret the meaning of the Second Amendment to the United
States Constitution). But see Heller, 554 U.S. at 637 (5-4 decision) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (suggesting that an analysis of history and the Framers' intent would be a
better means for interpreting the United States Constitution).
198. Heller, 554 U.S. at 576 ("The Constitution was written to be understood by the
voters; its words and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary as distinguished
from technical meaning.") (citing United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931)).
199. See id. at 665 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that the "fairest and most rational
method to interpret the will of the legislator, is by exploring his intentions at the time
when the law was made."); see also Sprague, 282 U.S. at 731 ("[W]here the intention is
clear there is no room for construction and no excuse for interpolation or addition.").
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Thus, both the federal and state Constitutions' terms should be
interpreted by first looking to the original public meaning of the text. 2 00
The Pennsylvania Constitution provides:
In all criminal prosecutions the accused hath a right to be heard by
himself and his counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to be confronted with the witnesses against
him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and, in prosecutions by indictment or information, a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury of the vicinage ... .201
The relevant section of the Pennsylvania Constitution above should
be read to mean that the accused "hath" the right to "be confronted by the
witnesses against him," "[i]n all criminal prosecutions."2 02 Therefore,
one can reasonably conclude that any ordinary citizen, due to the
denotative definition of the words in the sentence, would understand the
right of confrontation guaranteed by the Pennsylvania Constitution's
Declaration of Rights to apply "[i]n all criminal prosecutions." 2 03
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the States and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted by the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in
his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.204
'Similarly parsed, the United States Constitution would be
understood by a layman to provide substantially the same rights to the
accused as the Pennsylvania Constitution affords, "[i]n all criminal
prosecutions" and not just at trial. 2 05 The amendment would be read by
200.

See supra notes 174-76 and accompanying text.

201.

PA. CONST. art. I,

§ 9.

202. See id.
203. See supra notes 201-02 and accompanying text; but see Pennsylvania v.
Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 52-53 (1987) (plurality) (reasoning that the right to confrontation
only applies at the time of trial).
204. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
205. Because their language is almost identical, laymen would likely understand the
state and federal Confrontation Clauses to provide essentially the same protections.
However, courts have often interpreted the Pennsylvania Constitution to provide far
greater protections to its citizens than the United States Constitution does. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 888 (Pa. 1991) (holding that Article I,
Section 8 does not recognize the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule articulated
by the Court in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922-25 (1984), and providing a
four-part test to determine whether the Pennsylvania Constitution provides greater
protection than the U.S. Constitution). However, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
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the average citizen, to whom the rights directly apply, as meaning that
the "accused" "enjoys" the right to confrontation, "[i]n all criminal
,,206
prosecutions.
In reading either the Pennsylvania Constitution or the United States
Constitution, the majority of the public would most likely understand
that, as an accused, they have the right to a speedy and public trial, to-be
informed of the nature and cause of accusations, to be confronted by the
witnesses against them, to a compulsory process for obtaining witnesses,
and to assistance of counsel for their defense.207 In addition, people
would likely understand that these rights do not exist only at the trial, but
at all stages during the criminal prosecution.2 08
Of course, there exists a counterargument that the phrase "all
criminal prosecutions" is different than "all criminal proceedings," and
that the former means that all individuals are entitled to confront their
accusers at some point during the prosecution, and not necessarily at
every stage of the trial. 20 9 However, even if this assertion is accepted, a
defendant's right to confrontation can still be violated at the preliminary
hearing stage if his or her inability to cross-examine a witness impedes
on his or her ability to effectively conduct cross-examination at trial.2 10
Although an ordinary reading of the confrontation clauses of the
federal and state constitutions suggests otherwise, the Ricker court
ultimately determined that defendants do not have a right to
confrontation before trial.211 Ricker's holding was likely influenced by
the court's consideration of the Framers' intent and the rarity of
recently reversed many of its prior, more protective decisions and has increasingly
favored uniform interpretations of the two constitutions. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Gary, 91 A.3d 102, 138 (Pa. 2014) (adopting the federal per se exception to the warrant
requirement for vehicle searches); Commonwealth v. Batts, 66 A.3d 286, 299 (Pa. 2013)
(holding that Pennsylvania's constitutional prohibition against cruel punishment is
equivalent to the U.S. Constitution for juvenile sentences). See generally Bruce
Ledewitz, Beyond Edmunds: The State ConstitutionalLegacy of ChiefJustice RonaldD.
Castille, 53 DuQ. L. REv. 371 (2015).
206.

See U.S. Const. AMEND. VI.

207.
208.

Id See also PA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
See supra notes 201-06 and accompanying text.

209.

See Prosecution, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) ("2. A criminal

proceeding in which an accused person is tried <the conspiracy trial involved the
prosecution of seven defendants>. - Also termed criminal prosecution."); see also
CriminalProsecution, BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY (2010) ("The use of the processes

of the law to accuse or charge a person with the commission of a crime, to bring him
before a court, to convict him of the offense, and to impose upon him such punishment as
is provided by law for the offense.").
210. See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 61-62 (1987) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) ("In my view, there might well be a confrontation violation if, as here, a
defendant is denied pretrial access to information that would make possible effective
cross-examination of a crucial prosecution witness.").
211. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
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preliminary hearings during the ratification of the Pennsylvania
Constitution.212
2.

The Framers' Intent in Creating the Confrontation Clause

In Ricker, the Pennsylvania Superior Court discussed the lengthy
history of preliminary hearings in Pennsylvania.213
In England,
preliminary hearings were held to prevent justices of the peace from
indiscriminately releasing the accused and for purposes of
interrogation.2 14 After the hearing's implementation, information was
often obtained at preliminary hearings and used against the accused at
trial.2 15 This prompted frequent demands by the prisoner to meet his
accusers before trial.216 Subsequently, the right to confrontation was
born first as a statutory right.217 Therefore, curing the harms caused by
the statements taken pre-trial seemed to be the exact and unfettered
intention of the Framers when they adopted the confrontation clauses of
the federal and state constitutions.218
Despite the acknowledged intent of the Framers in formulating the
right to confrontation, the Ricker court contended that the right did not
apply at preliminary hearings because "at the time of the ratification of
the federal and early Pennsylvania Constitutions, the phrase 'criminal
prosecutions' did not encompass a preliminary hearing." 2 19 Contrary to
this argument, in Districtof Columbia v. Heller,220 the Court rejected the
contention that the Second Amendment protected only the possession of
those weapons that were in existence during the eighteenth century.22 1
212. See supranote 178 and accompanying text.
213. Commonwealth v. Ricker, 120 A.3d 349, 358-59 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015).
214. Id. at 358.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 363 ("We acknowledge that one of the primary harms sought to be
remedied by the federal and Pennsylvania Confrontation Clause was the English practice
of using statements taken pre-trialto establish guilt at trial without affording the accused
an opportunity to cross-examine the witness. Thus, the very reason for the constitutional
right was because an accused could not confront those witnesses during the earlier
proceedings.") (emphasis added); but see Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968) ("[It]
is this literal right to 'confront' the witness at the time of trial that forms the core of the
values furthered by the Confrontation Clause.").
219. Ricker, 120 A.3d at 363.
220. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576 (2008).
221. See id. at 582 ("Some have made the argument, bordering on the frivolous, that
only those arms in existence in the 18th century are protected by the Second Amendment.
We do not interpret constitutional rights that way. Just as the First Amendment protects
modem forms of communications, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997), and the
Fourth Amendment applies to modem forms of search, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533
U.S. 27 (2001), the Second Amendment extends, prima facie, to all instruments that
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Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, stated that constitutional rights were
not to be interpreted in this way.222 The Ricker court used reasoning
analogous to that which the court in Heller rejected: because preliminary
hearings did not exist in full capacity at the time the Constitution was
adopted, the protections enumerated in the Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Clause were not applicable to such a proceeding. 223 In
interpreting the right of confrontation in this prohibited manner, the
Ricker court denied the defendant a right to crucial pre-trial testimony
that would aid his defense.224
Despite the Supreme Court's reasoning in Heller, the Ricker court
determined that the right of the defendant to be confronted by his
accusers, enumerated in the Sixth Amendment, did not apply during the
preliminary hearing stage.225 However, courts have applied other
individual rights within the Sixth Amendment before trial.226
3.
Comparing Confrontation Clause Rights to Other Rights
Enumerated in the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution
In Massiah v. United States,22 7 the Court defined the time from the
arraignment until trial as a crucial time in a criminal proceeding.228
Later, in Coleman v. Alabama,229 the Court held that a preliminary
hearing is a "critical stage" of a criminal prosecution so as to
constitutionally require the assistance of counsel. 2 30 The right of the
accused to have the representation of counsel for his defense is also
provided in the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 2 3 1
In Coleman, the United States Supreme Court reasoned that although
Alabama law did not require a preliminary hearing, 232 if one was held
certain constitutional rights were triggered because the hearing was
designed in such a way that handicapped the defendant who did not have
the representation of counsel.233 Pennsylvania has adopted a similar

constitute bearable arms, even those that were not in existence at the time of the
founding.").
222. Id
223. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
224. See infra notes 251-56 and accompanying text.
225. Commonwealth v. Ricker, 120 A.3d 349, 363 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015).
226. See infra notes 230-31 and accompanying text.
227. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
228. Id. at 205 ("[D]uring perhaps the most critical period of the proceedings . . . that
is to say, from the time of their arraignment until the beginning of their trial ....
229. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
230. See generally id.
231. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
232. Coleman, 399 U.S. at 8.
233. See id. at 9-10.
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design for screening cases before trial, i.e., the adversarial preliminary
hearing.234
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority of the Court in Coleman,
offered four reasons why the right to counsel should apply at preliminary
hearings.235 The reasons that the Court provided were as follows:
First, the lawyer's skilled examination and cross-examination of
witnesses may expose fatal weaknesses in the State's case that may
lead the magistrate to refuse to bind the accused over. Second, in any
event, the skilled interrogation of witnesses by an experienced lawyer
can fashion a vital impeachment tool for use in cross-examination of
the State's witnesses at the trial, or preserve testimony favorable to
the accused of a witness who does not appear at the trial. Third,
trained counsel can more effectively discover the case the State has
against his client and make possible the preparation of a proper
defense to meet that case at the trial. Fourth, counsel can also be
influential at the preliminary hearing in making effective arguments
for the accused on such matters as the necessity for an early
psychiatric examination or bail. 236
In Coleman, the Court suggested that cross-examination and full
exploration of the State's case is vital to the accused.237 Therefore, it
likely follows from the Court's reasoning that, in an adversarial
preliminary hearing such as the one afforded to defendants by
Pennsylvania law, the right of an accused to confront the witnesses
against him is of vital importance.238 Further, defendants who are not
afforded this opportunity of confrontation are unconstitutionally deprived
of their right to a fair trial.239 In Ricker, because the court admitted the
hearsay testimony of Trooper Kelley, the defendant was unable to crossexamine Trooper Trotta or Trooper Gingerich and was harmed as a
result. 2 40 Further, the two troopers were the key witnesses for the state,
but they were not under oath at the time they made statements to Trooper
Kelley. 241 Ricker also falls victim to the risks associated with the use of
hearsay evidence such as misperception of the eyewitnesses, faulty
memory or misstatement of the declarants, and the risk of the declarants'
234. PA. R. CRIm. P. 542; see also Commonwealth ex rel. Buchanan v. Verbonitz,
581 A.2d 172, 175 (Pa. 1990) ("A preliminary hearing is an adversarial proceeding which
is a critical stage in a criminal prosecution.").
235. Coleman, 399 U.S. at 9.
236. Id.
237. See id
238. See id.
239. See id
240. See infra note 255 and accompanying text; see also supra note 232 and
accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
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intentional or accidental distortion of the facts observed.2 42 Finally, as
suggested by Justice Blackmun, the defendant is now handicapped in
preparing his defense due to the absence of preliminary hearing
statements from the key eye witnesses to compare with the testimony
they present to the trier-of-fact during trial.243
4.

The Confrontation Clause Rights of the Accused

The right to confrontation enumerated in the Sixth Amendment of
the United States Constitution applies to the states by way of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 24
A primary interest secured by the
Confrontation Clause is the right to cross-examination. 245 Th1 value of
cross-examination lies in the ability of a party to expose falsehood and
bring out the truth.2 4 Therefore, the Court has scrupulously guarded
against restrictions imposed on the scope of cross-examination.24 7 The
Pennsylvania Superior Court has similarly recognized the importance of
the parties' ability to cross-examine witnesses at the preliminary hearing
stage. 24
Although a plurality of the Court in Pennsylvaniav. Ritchie24 9 stated
that "[t]he right to confrontation is basically a trial right," 250 Justice
Blackmun's concurrence identified that there might well be a
confrontation violation if the defendant is denied access to information
pretrial that would make an effective cross-examination of a crucial
prosecution witness possible. 25 1 He rejected the notion that the

242. See supra notes 48-63 and accompanying text.
243. See infra note 251 and accompanying text.
244. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403-06 (1965); see also U.S. CONsT.
amend. XIV.
245. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965).
246. Pointer, 380 U.S. at 404; see also Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980)
(reasoning that the underlying purpose of the Confrontation Clause is to "augment
accuracy in the factfinding process by ensuring the defendant an effective means to test
adverse evidence."); Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 52-53 (1987) ("Of course, the
right to cross-examine includes the opportunity to show that a witness is biased, or that
the testimony is exaggerated or unbelievable.").
247. Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 18 (1985) (per curiam); see also Ritchie,
480 U.S. at 66-67.
248. Commonwealth v. Redshaw, 323 A.2d 92, 94 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1974) ("Plainly the
guiding hand of counsel at the preliminary hearing is essential . . . . [T]he lawyer's
skilled examination and cross-examination of witnesses may expose fatal weaknesses in
the State's case that may lead the magistrate to refuse to bind the accused over. Second,
in any event, the skilled interrogation of witnesses by an experienced lawyer can fashion
a vital impeachment tool for use in cross-examination of the State's witnesses at the
trial.").
249. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987).
250. Id. at 52-53 (citing Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968)).
251. Id. at 61-62 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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Confrontation Clause protects only the trial rights of a defendant and has
no relevance pretrial.2 52
Dissenting in Ritchie, Justice Brennan also offered that "[t]he
creation of a significant impediment to the conduct of cross-examination
thus undercuts the protections of the Confrontation Clause, even if that
impediment is not erected at the trial itself." 2 53 Moreover, he contended
that allowing the defendant the ability to compare statements made
pretrial with those made at the trial itself was essential to testing a
witness's reliability and accuracy of recounting events.254 Denial of
access to the witnesses' prior statements handicaps the defendant in a
way that strikes at the heart of cross-examination. 25 5 In Ricker, the
defendant is now without pre-trial statements from the prosecution's key
eyewitnesses.2 56
Similarly, in Gerstein v. Pugh,2 57 the Court suggested that a right to
confront witnesses exists at the type of preliminary hearing used in
Pennsylvania. 2 58 The Court held that the Fourth Amendment requires
that probable cause is established before the liberty of a defendant is
further restrained following arrest.259 Therefore, the importance of the
issue justifies the presentation of witnesses and full exploration of their
testimony on cross-examination. 2 60
Although the defendant in Ricker did not advance a due process
claim, there exists another argument against the sole use of hearsay
evidence in establishing a prima facie case at a preliminary hearing. 261 It
has been suggested that this may be a better avenue for argument as it
evades the Confrontation Clause argument altogether.262
5.

The Due Process Clause: A Better Avenue for Argument?

In Ricker, the defendant failed to raise or develop an argument as to
whether the procedure of admitting hearsay evidence as the sole means
of establishing the prima facie case violates the due process clauses of
the Pennsylvania and federal constitutions.263 An argument that Ricker's
procedural due process rights were violated would have been a more
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

Id at 61.
Id. at 71 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
See supra notes 118-23 and accompanying text.
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
Commonwealth v. Ricker, 120 A.3d 349, 362 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015).
Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 114.
Id. at 120.
See infra note 264 and accompanying text; see also Ricker, 120 A.3d at 355.
See infra note 279 and accompanying text.
See Ricker, 120 A.3d at 355.
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persuasive assertion.264 However, the overarching outcome sought by
defendants like Ricker may not be achieved, because the due process
standard for the admission of hearsay is lower than the Confrontation
Clause standard for the admission of hearsay outlined in Crawford v.
Washington.265
The right of confrontation has long been recognized as essential to
due process. 26 6 Based on the idea of fundamental fairness, the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment acts as an independent
limit on the procedural actions of a state in charging and convicting a
criminal defendant.2 67 Due process seeks procedural fairness for the
accused irrespective of whether the process challenged is prohibited by
the guarantees in the Bill of Rights. 2 68 Therefore, the procedural
limitations of due process act independently of those enumerated in the
Bill of Rights, including the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment. 26 9 To determine whether a procedure is a violation of due
process, courts usually apply a "totality of the circumstances" test, as the
Court did in Chambers v. Mississippi.2 70
In Chambers, the Court held that the defendant's due process rights
had been violated when Mississippi's rules of evidence did not allow him
to cross-examine his hostile defense witnesses or call subsequent
The Court determined that when
witnesses for his defense. 2 7 1
considering all the circumstances, the defendant had been denied the
right to a fundamentally fair trial.272 This finding of unconstitutionality
rested on on due process grounds and not on whether the Mississippi
rules of evidence violated the confrontation rights enumerated in the
Sixth Amendment

264. See Christine Holst, The Confrontation Clause and PretrialHearings: A Due
Process Solution, 2010 U. ILL. L. REv. 1599, 1627 (2010) ("Therefore, the due process
approach seems to be the best way to reconcile the need to protect a defendant's rights
prior to trial with conflicting Supreme Court precedent regarding the applicability of the
Confrontation Clause at pretrial hearings.").
265. Id. at 1626 ("It is unlikely, for example, that many defendants will be successful
in challenging hearsay testimony at pretrial hearings under the due process approach
unless it is so unreliable that its admission is considered fundamentally unfair. But if the
Court's test in Crawford were applied, a defendant would have a much better chance of
preventing hearsay evidence from being considered at a pretrial hearing.").
266. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973).
267. Holst, supra note 264, at 1623; see also U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
268. Holst, supra note 264, at 1623 (citing Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 337
(1986) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
269. Id
270. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
271. Holst, supra note 264, at 1624 (citing Chambers, 410 U.S. at 294, 302).
272. Id
273. Id
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As in Chambers, courts could apply a due process analysis to the
use of hearsay evidence at preliminary hearings and thereby surpass the
Confrontation Clause question which the defendant raised in Ricker.2 74
In taking this approach, courts can avoid wading through the
inconsistencies of the United States Supreme Court precedent concerning
the Confrontation Clause and preliminary hearings.27 5 Instead, courts
may avoid an "all or nothing approach" by taking into consideration any
factors deemed relevant to the procedural fairness of the process used in
the case currently at bench.276
Although the Court has indicated that the categories of infractions
that are to be considered to violate "fundamental fairness" should be
construed narrowly,2 77 it has also acknowledged that the right to
confrontation is essential to due process. 78 The due process approach at
least gives defendants a chance to challenge limitations on their ability to
confront witnesses where the court has ruled that the right to
confrontation does not apply. 2 7 9
IV. CONCLUSION

When taking the text within the confrontation clauses of the
Pennsylvania Constitution and the United States Constitution in their
ordinary and plain meaning, an average citizen would understand the
accused to be afforded the rights therein during the entirety of the
criminal prosecution and not just at trial.2 80 To interpret the rights
otherwise, because the historical "criminal prosecution" did not
encompass preliminary hearings, is to engage in reasoning deemed
improper by the United States Supreme Court.28 1 Moreover, one of the
primary purposes of the Framers in creating the right of confrontation
was to cure the harms caused by statements taken pre-trialwithout crossexamination.282

274. Id. See generally Commonwealth v. Ricker, 120 A.3d 349 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2015).
275. Holst, supranote 264, at 1625.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 1626 (citing Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352 (1990)).
278. Id. See also Commonwealth v. Mignogna, 585 A.2d 1, 4 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990)
("While we agree with appellant's assertion that a preliminary hearing is a critical stage
of the criminal process and that such hearings are not to become 'hearsay mills,' a
defendant must establish the existence of actual prejudice arising from a denial of due
process at the preliminary hearing in order to be afforded the remedy of discharge.").
279. Holst, supranote 264, at 1627.
280. See supra notes 207-08 and accompanying text.
281. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 215-18 and accompanying text.
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The Court has interpreted preliminary hearings to be such a crucial
part of the criminal adjudicatory process as to trigger other individual
constitutional rights.283 The Court has also suggested that, in order to
satisfy the probable cause standard that accompanies a preliminary
hearing, the importance of the defendant's rights to a fair criminal
prosecution justifies the presentation of witnesses and full exploration of
their testimony on cross-examination.28 4 Otherwise, defendants may be
handicapped in preparing their defense and confronted by the risks that
coincide with the use of hearsay evidence, 28 5 as Ricker was when he was
denied the opportunity to cross-examine the testimony of two key
witnesses for the Commonwealth.286 Further, Ricker's defense was
handicapped because of the loss of available information pre-trial which
would allow him to effectively cross-examine key government witnesses
at trial.2 8 7 Although some precedent provides that the right of
confrontation is only a trial right, 28 8 Justice Brennan reasons that even if
an impediment on cross-examination is not erected at the trial itself, such
impediment may still undermine the protections of the Confrontation
Clause.2 89
Because precedent on the application of the Confrontation Clause
pretrial is convoluted, a better possibility for argument may be the Due
Process Clause. 2 90 An argument that the defendant has been denied fair
process surpasses a defendant's need to show the violation of a particular
liberty within the Bill of Rights.29 1
To find that a prima facie case may be established based on hearsay
evidence alone would be to accept the contention that preliminary
hearings are nothing more than ceremonial formalities as Ricker has
stated.29 2 The accused may be incarcerated at length while awaiting trial
or made to furnish bail without confronting his accusers.293
Hearsay evidence alone cannot be sufficient to establish a prima
facie case against the accused at a preliminary hearing. The Framers of
both the federal and state constitutions afforded criminal defendants
fundamental rights for a reason:
to prevent such injustices, as

283.
284.

See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
See supra note 260 and accompanying text.

285.

See supra notes 254-55 and accompanying text.

286.
287.

See supra note 256 and accompanying text.
See supra note 251 and accompanying text.

288.

See supra note 250 and accompanying text.

289.
290.
291.
292.
293.

See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 274-75 and accompanying text.
See supra note 268 and accompanying text.
See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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exemplified in Ricker.294 Ordering incarceration or bailment, in any
capacity or amount, without first affording defendants the right to
confront their accusers cuts to the core of the confrontation clauses and
the very purpose for which they were created.29 S

294.
295.

See PA. CONST. art. I, § 9; see also U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
See supra notes 215-18 and accompanying text.
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